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DAMAGE ABATEMENT AND COMPENSATION
PROGRAMS AS INCENTIVES FOR WILDLIFE
MANAGEMENT ON PRIVATE LAND
JONATHAN K. YODER
Abstract: Public damage abatement and compensation programs may be used to alter private incentives for damage abatement
and habitat provision. A model is developed that explains the economic logic behind prevalent characteristics of public wildlife
damage programs. The model is supported with an examination of a broad cross-section of wildlife agency policy and law. The
model can be used by wildlife managers and policy makers as a conceptual framework for understanding the incentive effects
of compensation and abatement policy.
Key Words: abatement, compensation, damage, incentives, management, wildlife.

Wildlife imposes costs on landowners in the form
of crop damage, livestock depredation, and damage to
a wide variety of other productive capital. Fifty-five
percent of agricultural producers in the United States
reported some level of wildlife damage in 1989, and
total estimated damage for the country was as high as
US$1.26 billion (Wywialowski 1994). Agricultural landowners provide much of the wildlife habitat throughout
the United States and the world, and wildlife-inflicted
property damage may provide incentives to reduce the
quantity and quality of habitat on private land.
Most state wildlife agencies maintain some form
of program to address wildlife damage to agricultural
property (Lueck 1989, Lueck and Yoder 1997). Two central elements of most programs are abatement support
and compensation. Abatement support takes the form of
agency consultation services, abatement activities performed by agency personnel at landowners’ request,
and subsidies for abatement capital such as fences
and dispersal devices. Approximately 25 state and provincial agencies in the United States and Canada maintain compensation programs, which provide reimbursement for damage sustained by agricultural landowners
(Wagner et al. 1997). Compensation is usually available
for damage inflicted on specific property types, and by
specific wildlife species. In return for compensation,
agencies often place requirements on landowner abatement, land-use practices, and hunting access.
Compensation and abatement programs are also
maintained by at least one private environmental group,
as well as various public wildlife agencies worldwide.
Defenders of Wildlife currently offers compensation to
livestock producers near Yellowstone National Park who
suffer depredation from reintroduced wolves, and for
grizzly bear predation around Glacier National Park.
From 1987 to February 2000, Defenders of Wildlife has
compensated 113 ranchers a total of US$112,107 for 149
lost cattle, 319 lost sheep, and 14 other units of livestock
(Defenders of Wildlife 2000).

Wagner et al. (1997) provide a summary of wildlife compensation programs. They also list 6 possible
motivations for damage compensation programs: 1) to
account for severe losses that may threaten the livelihood of agricultural producers, 2) to address common
problems involving a large proportion of citizens, 3)
to offset restrictions on abatement tools due to animal
rights concerns, 4) to address wildlife problems made
more severe by management actions taken by government agencies, 5) to address recently emerging or
increasingly more severe wildlife damage problems, and
6) to address problems caused by highly valued species.
The authors came to the conclusion that motives 4, 5,
and 6 are likely explanations for the use of compensation programs, but provide no underlying conceptual
model for understanding why compensation programs
are appropriate.
This paper examines compensation and abatement programs as a means of contracting over wildlife
management on private land. A model is developed that
sheds light on the economic structure of compensation
and abatement programs, and the motivation for maintaining these programs as a contracting tool. The model
is based on 2 fundamental assumptions: 1) that wildlife
damage law and policy is designed as if to maximize the
net value of wildlife populations, and 2) that landowners are in a unique position of control for managing
wildlife on their land, regardless of how the legal rights
to utilize and/or regulate wildlife are distributed. The
implications of the model are then examined in the
context of compensation and abatement programs in
the United States and Canada. The model is generally
consistent with the findings and conclusions of Wagner
et al. (1997) outlined in the previous paragraph, and
thus provides a conceptual framework for understanding and addressing wildlife damage on private land and
to private property in general.
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THEORY
For modeling purposes, a clear distinction will be
made between the beneficiaries of the wildlife stock
and the owners of wildlife habitat. Assume 2 specialized
producers: 1 farmer who produces crops and owns
the land upon which the wildlife range, and a neighboring wildlife manager who values the wildlife for hunting and non-consumptive uses. This distinction allows a
relatively simple comparison between economically efficient (net-value-maximizing) levels of hunting pressure
by hunters and damage abatement by farmers and private incentives for hunting and damage abatement. This
comparison between private and social optima then
forms the foundation for an analysis of the factors that
inhibit efficient hunting and abatement levels and shape
wildlife damage policy.
Independent action and efficiency: a comparison
Consider first the objectives and choices of the
farmer and the wildlife manager when acting independently. The farmer’s objective is to minimize damage by
utilizing an abatement input x:
V f = maxx(1 - δ (x; h))y – cx,
(1)
where y is potential (before damage) revenue from
farming, δ (·) ε (0, 1) is the damage rate, and c is the marginal cost of abatement. Hunting effort h by the wildlife
manager is taken as exogenous by the farmer when the
2 are acting independently. The damage decreases at
a decreasing rate with respect to abatement in the economically relevant range of x: δ x < 0, δ xx > 0 (subscripts
represent derivatives – e.g., δ xx =
). The first order
condition for the farmer is
–yδ x– c = 0.
(2)
This condition implies that the farmer will set
x so that the value of reductions in damage from an
additional unit of x equal the unit cost of x.

The wildlife manager may benefit from wildlife in
2 ways: by valuing the flows from the wildlife stock in
the form of hunting, and by valuing the wildlife stock
itself. The benefits from hunting and wildlife for the
wildlife manager will be modeled as
V w = max α f (h) + βw(h; x) – rh,
(3)
h
where r is the marginal cost of hunting effort or provision of hunting services, and α f(h) are hunting benefits
for a given wildlife stock with α > 0, f h > 0 and f hh < 0.
The value of the wildlife stock is βw(h; x), with β >
0, wx < 0, wh < 0, and whh > 0. The value of the stock
itself ( βw) is its net present value for future production
of hunting services as well as its present value for nonconsumptive uses. This formulation allows recognition
of the value of future use of the stock without explicitly
introducing the complications of a dynamic analysis.
The wildlife manager harvests (hunts) to maximize this benefit function, subject to the farmer’s abatement action. He does so by setting h to satisfy
αf h + βwh– r = 0.
(4)
This condition implies that the wildlife manager hunts
to the point that the marginal benefit from hunting
equals the marginal cost of hunting in terms of reductions in the wildlife stock and the cost of providing
hunting services.
Above, the farmer and the wildlife manager are
assumed to make their choices independently of each
other as described, but their choices affect each other:
hunting affects the damage rate, and abatement affects
the value of the wildlife stock. As a result, independent
action will lead to inefficient allocation of these 2 inputs
because the individuals do not bear the full costs and/or
benefits of their own actions. For comparison, consider
joint maximization of the net value of the wildlife stock:
V = m ax αf(h) + βw(h, x) – yδ(x, h) – cx – rh, (5)
h,x

Fig. 1. A comparison of private and optimal abatement and hunting levels.
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Hunting and abatement are assumed to be technical
substitutes in abatement, so that δ hx = δ xh > 0. The firstorder condition for the joint maximization problem is
αf h + βwh– yδ h – r = 0

(6a)

β w x– y δ x – c = 0
(6b)
Because hunting pressure and abatement effort are set
to include their marginal effects on both the value of
wildlife uses and the damage rate, all effects are internalized and this result is efficient.
Fig. 1 summarizes the independent and efficient
results. In both panels, “MB” stands for “marginal benefit,” the benefit accrued from a unit of the effort, and
“MC” is “marginal cost,” the cost of an additional unit of
effort. In the left frame, MC farmer is the marginal cost to
the farmer of the farmer’s abatement, and MC wildlife is the
loss of value in the wildlife population resulting from an
additional unit of abatement, and MC social is the vertical
sum of the two marginal cost curves. Abatement level
x f represents the farmer’s private optimal abatement
level, defined by the intersection of MC farmer and MB farmer
(as required by equation (2)). Abatement level xs represents the social optimum, which accounts for the
marginal damage to the wildlife population imposed by
the farmer’s abatement effort. The same logic underlies
the right frame of Fig. 1.
The crucial result of the analysis thus far is that
when individuals consider only their private benefits
and costs (not those of others affected by their actions),
too little hunting, and too much abatement will occur
relative to social optimum. Thus, to maximize the net
value of wildlife, hunting pressure should account for
wildlife-inflicted damage, and damage abatement should
account for any foregone gains from hunting or wildlife
viewing. Assuming costless contracting, the gains from
changing abatement and hunting rates to their respective efficient levels equals the sum of the 2 triangles
that lie between the private and socially optimal effort
levels in Fig. 1.
Given that the net value of the wildlife stock
may be increased by altering abatement and hunting
effort from private levels, the next question, which
leads directly to policy implications, is how to instigate
such a change. The following section examines this
problem in the context of an environment where the
participants – the landowner and the wildlife manager –
have incomplete information about the other’s actions,
and monitoring private actions is difficult and costly. In
this environment, the form of contract (law or policy)
will be determined to a large extent by the nature
of the information deficiencies and contracting costs
associated with implementing a contract.

WILDLIFE DAMAGE POLICY: CONSTRAINTS AND
ALTERNATIVES
The above analysis is based on the implicit
assumption that the farmer effectively has the right to
perform any type of abatement at any level, and the
wildlife manager effectively has the right to set the
hunting rate. No other property rights to wildlife are
specified. In reality, state and federal governments in
the United States hold legal jurisdiction over wildlife,
and they enforce restrictions over actions that affect the
value of the wildlife stock such as harassment, hunting,
and trapping. This legal arrangement can be viewed as
a contractual response to overharvesting that evolved
through common law into specialized game agencies.
(Lueck and Yoder 1997).
Legal jurisdiction, however, is not synonymous
with complete control over a resource. In reality, information about private land use practices is not costlessly
available to public wildlife managers. This means that
enforcement and control of the use of wildlife resources
on private land will be costly and incomplete. The value
of a given form of contractual arrangement (policy or
law) for managing wildlife depends in part on how
costly it is to induce a given contracted change in
resource allocation.
The model presented above will now be extended
with the following additional maintained hypothesis:
the farmers’ abatement labor effort is likely to be among
the most difficult activities to monitor by the wildlife
manager. Trespass laws and specific knowledge about
the landholding and surrounding area provide landowners with a substantial information advantage about the
abatement effort and use of their own land. The potential for hidden abatement action (or inaction) makes
contract enforcement difficult and costly for labor
contracts in general, and is the basis for a vast
literature on contract structure applied to a wide variety of problems. Empirical analyses include Leffler and
Rucker (1991, timber contracts), Allen and Lueck (1992
1993, cropshare contracts) and Knoeber (1989, broiler
chicken production).
Consider an illustration of this problem. Suppose
that the wildlife manager agrees to pay the farmer up
to the full value of the wildlife services lost due to a
unit of abatement effort in exchange for a unit reduction
in farmer abatement. In principle, the farmer would
accept any payment equal to or greater than the marginal private benefit of abatement, because this is what
the farmer is giving up by reducing abatement. The
result would be an equilibrium of xs and a total payment
to the farmer up to the size of the gray triangle on
the left-hand panel of Fig. 1. However, for the wildlife
manager to be willing to pay the farmer, he must be
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confident that the farmer will in fact reduce abatement
by that much. To be sure of this, the wildlife manager
must monitor the farmer’s abatement effort. Honesty
and integrity of the farmer notwithstanding, the farmer
still has an economic incentive to perform the abatement he said he wouldn’t perform if there is a chance
of not being caught. Because monitoring landowner
abatement labor such as this is particularly difficult and
costly, there will usually be a substantial possibility of
not being caught. This problem reduces the value of
a payment contract based explicitly on farmer abatement labor effort. If monitoring farmer abatement is
prohibitively costly, the contract would have little or no
economic value.
What can be said about wildlife damage policy
in light of this enforcement problem? Three types of
contracts (laws and policy) over wildlife damage are
common, and they will be examined in detail with
the support of the model: 1) landowner exceptions to
general regulations on harassing and killing wildlife,1
2) wildlife agency abatement support, and 3) compensation programs. These contracting instruments are not
mutually exclusive. Each has its comparative advantages
as incentive instruments, each of them has weaknesses,
and all 3 or a combination of them are often utilized by
an agency to address wildlife damage on private land.
Abatement rights and restrictions
The benefits and costs of regulatory restrictions
are perhaps the most straightforward to understand.
The social benefits of restricting abatement are, at best,
the value of the gray triangle in Fig. 1. It can be shown
with the mathematical model and the figure that this triangle increases with increases in the marginal value of
the wildlife affected by the abatement and the marginal
impact of abatement on the value of the wildlife. Therefore, despite the costs of enforcement, as these factors
increase, the value of enforcing abatement restrictions
increases.
A special case to consider is that in which the
potential costs of abatement restrictions tend to be so
high that they outweigh the total social costs of allowing abatement. To see this, suppose that the problem
animal was a bear, and the only effective abatement
method was a rifle. Then consider 2 possible types of
damage the bear might inflict: personal injury or death,
or damage to a garbage can. To kill a bear in defense
of health or life can be represented by a high marginal
benefit, whereas defense of a garbage can will provide
less benefit. Relaxing restrictions on shooting a bear
for personal defense is more likely to be economically
justifiable than shooting in defense of a garbage can.
Thus, as the potential costs of abatement restrictions
1

The landowner exceptions are in addition to more generally applicable rights
to defend property, such as additional hunting rights not accorded to nonlandowners.
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increase, such restrictions become less economically
justifiable.
Specific implications can be drawn from the
general analysis above. These and subsequent implications will be phrased in normative terms based on the
assumption that the objective of wildlife management
is to maximize the net value of wildlife. These normative statements can be interpreted in 2 ways: First, if
wildlife management policy has in fact developed as if
to maximize the net value of wildlife resources, then
existing wildlife policy should be generally consistent
with these implications. Second, if an explicit objective
of wildlife management is to maximize the net value of
wildlife resources, then the design of wildlife damage
policy should reflect these implications. Each of these
implications apply in ceteris paribus terms; holding
all else constant. Some of these implications may seem
self-evident, but this is probably because they are in
fact reflected in current wildlife damage policy. They
are included to illustrate the empirical promise of this
general model.
Implication 1. Abatement restrictions should
apply to highly valued wildlife species.
Implication 2. Abatement restrictions should
apply for abatement methods that are relatively
harmful to the wildlife population.
Implication 3. Abatement restrictions should be
weak if the value of the resulting increase in
damage is high.
Implication 4. Supplementary hunting should be
promoted if it is productive in terms of damage
reduction.
Factors that increase the costs of enforcement
will, as discussed above, reduce the extent that direct
abatement restrictions are imposed, or at least the
extent to which they are effective. Thus the same
restrictions imposed on landowners (such as restrictions on killing game out of season), may be harder to
enforce for landowners than nonlandowners. Furthermore, Lueck and Yoder (1997) argue that large landowners are likely to internalize more of the effects of their
abatement and wildlife management activities, so their
private wildlife use will tend to be closer to efficient,
and abatement restrictions should tend to be less restrictive.
Compensation
Compensation for damage from a wildlife manager to a landowner is essentially a form of damage sharing. Compensating a landowner for damage reduces the
marginal benefit to the landowner of abatement effort.
To see this, consider the case in which the wildlife
agency compensates the landowner for 100% of the
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damage sustained by wildlife, as well as any costs the
landowner accrues as a result of the transaction. The
landowner will have no incentive to expend abatement
effort, because he or she gains nothing from it.
The benefits of compensation, then, result from
the fact that farmers have a weaker incentive to pursue
abatement that is potentially harmful to the wildlife
population. If there were only 1 implementable form of
abatement for the landowner to use, the efficient level
of abatement could be induced by setting the compensation rates such that the effective (post-compensation)
marginal product of private abatement equals the marginal cost of private abatement. In the left panel of Fig.
1, as the compensation rate increases, the MB farmer shifts
downward. The efficient compensation rate would be
that which shifted the MB farmer curve downward until it
crosses MC farmer at xs.
There is a crucial problem with compensation,
however. If the landowner utilizes 2 or more abatement
methods that differ in their impact on the wildlife stock,
the incentive effect of compensation is a double-edged
sword. Suppose the landowner privately utilizes 2 abatement methods: 1 that harms the wildlife, and 1 that has
no effect on the value of the wildlife. Providing compensation, suppose again 100% compensation, will remove
the landowner’s incentive to perform both kinds of
abatement. For a given level of savings in terms of the
value of the wildlife stock, the total damage sustained
will be higher because the landowner will reduce the
farmer’s use of both types of abatement, and compensation as a contracting mechanism will be more
costly. Loosely speaking, the efficiency gains from a
compensation program are lower if the farmer’s abatement options have highly variable effects on the wildlife
stock. This is because the compensation mechanism
does not target abatement effort directly, but only indirectly through its effect on total damage.
Contracting costs are associated with the maintenance of a compensation program as well. Compensation is contingent on the level of damage, and requires
explicit and credible measurement of total damage. The
process of measuring and verifying the cause of damage
is not costless, and the aggregate value of a compensation program will be reduced by the cost of measuring damage.2 Measurement costs depend on various
factors stemming from both the technical process of
damage measurement, and bargaining and monitoring
issues between the 2 parties stemming from virtual
inevitability of imperfect measurement of damage. One
particularly important determinant of measurement
costs is heterogeneity of the damaged resource. As heterogeneity of the damaged resource increases, the costs
of calculating damage are likely to increase. Along the
2

These costs are analogous to the “pricing” or “metering” costs as discussed in
McManus (1975) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972), respectively.

same lines, damage to annual crops is likely to be easier
to calculate (more accurately calculated) than change
to perennials, because the impact of current damage
on future value of a perennial crop (e.g., the value
of damage to pine seedlings) will be more difficult to
ascertain.3 Furthermore, existing markets for an agricultural resource provide information about resource value
in the form of prices. If a market for a damaged commodity does not exist, this increases the difficulty of
measuring the value of damaged property. Implications
of the foregoing discussion include:
Implication 5. Compensation programs should
target valuable species.
Implication 6. Compensation programs should
target individuals who maintain significant control over the wildlife stock and/or its habitat.
Implication 7. Compensation programs should
target homogeneous and annual crops, or other
property for which damage is relatively easily
quantifiable.
Implication 8. Compensation programs should
target products for which substantial markets
exist.
Abatement support and subsidies
Consider again the 2 forms of abatement discussed in the previous section on Compensation: 1 form
that harms the wildlife stock, and 1 form that does
not. It would appear that the wildlife manager should
be indifferent to the benign form of abatement, and
support reductions in abatement that harms wildlife.
At first glance there is no apparent reason for wildlife
managers to promote any form of abatement. Yet most
wildlife agencies provide abatement support of various
kinds, including consultation services, direct support
in the form of agency personnel labor, and subsidies
for various forms of abatement technologies such as
fencing.
A plausible economic basis for agency abatement
support is that different forms of abatement act as technical substitutes for each other. That is, the use of 1
form of abatement reduces the marginal productivity
and leads to a decline in the marginal productivity of
other forms of abatement when simultaneously applied.
For example, the installation of a fence for keeping deer
out of a crop field will reduce the damage-reduction
benefits that accrue from thinning the local deer population in the general attempt to reduce damage. Thus,
increased use of a benign abatement technology like
fencing will reduce the incentive that farmers have to
reduce the local deer population or rely on depredation
permits in an attempt to reduce crop damage.
3

Other factors affecting measurement costs may include spatial diversity and
patchiness of crop types.
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Two characteristics of fencing make it an excellent example of an abatement input that might serve
as a basis for contracting between a farmer and a wildlife manager. First, its maintenance is relatively easy to
monitor by both parties. Unlike the farmer’s labor effort,
its continued existence and maintenance is observable
at any given time. Second, it has a relatively low impact
on the wildlife population. As discussed above, the
installation and maintenance of a fence will reduce the
incentive that farmers may have to perform abatement
more harmful to the wildlife stock. If fencing is a productive abatement tool, it may therefore be in the best
interest of a wildlife manager to subsidize the installation of fencing and monitor its continued maintenance
by the farmer as part of a contract in order to reduce the
farmer’s incentive to perform more harmful abatement
methods.
Wildlife manager abatement labor on private land
is another interesting substitute for farmer abatement
labor effort. There are 2 differences between these 2
forms of abatement. The wildlife manager has a stake in
wildlife (if only as an intermediary for hunters and other
stakeholders), and it is likely to be easier (less costly)
for a farmer to monitor the wildlife manager’s activities
on the farmer’s own land than it would be for the wildlife manager to monitor the landowners activities on the
farmer’s own land.4 Thus, we can assume that the wildlife manager will attempt to minimize the impact on the
wildlife stock as he or she carries out contracted abatement activities under the watchful eye of the farmer.
It is important to recognize that while different
abatement inputs may be substitutes for each other,
they are generally not perfect substitutes. For example,
landowners are likely able to more effectively address
damage problems in which timing of abatement is crucial and living on site helps in this process. Fencing
may not be a very productive abatement input or may
be prohibitively costly, despite its useful characteristics
discussed previously. Implications from this discussion
include the following:
Implication 9. Abatement programs should promote agency personnel abatement labor.
Implication 10. Abatement programs should promote benign abatement techniques.
Implication 11. Abatement programs should promote monitorable fixed abatement capital.
Joint compensation and abatement programs
Recall that damage compensation reduces the
incentives for landowners to carry out all forms of abate4

Note that gains from specialization do not necessarily differentiate farmer
abatement from wildlife manager abatement. “Farmer abatement labor” may
well be carried out by private abatement specialists, or maybe even by the
personnel of public agencies not mandated to manage the wildlife population. The important difference is that wildlife manager or their constituents
are the beneficiaries of benign abatement techniques.
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ment including benign abatement. Thus, compensation
becomes a costly way of reducing the overall impact of
private abatement on the value of the wildlife stock. It
follows that if a wildlife manager maintains a compensation program, the benefits associated with the support
of benign and monitorable abatement technologies are
twofold. First, the use of these inputs further reduces
the incentive of farmers to pursue more harmful abatement methods due to the substitution effect. Second,
it directly offsets the compensation’s negative impact
on the farmer’s private incentive to use benign methods. Benign, monitorable abatement techniques therefore become especially valuable in conjunction with a
compensation program. An additional implication is:
Implication 12. Compensation should be contingent on the use of monitorable, benign abatement
techniques.
DISCUSSION
The implications of the model outlined in the
above sections will be discussed in the context of the
Wisconsin Wildlife Damage and Abatement and Claims
Program and a broad set of state wildlife regulations to
show that wildlife damage laws and policy are generally
consistent with a wealth maximization framework.
Wisconsin Wildlife Damage and Abatement
Program
The Wisconsin Bureau of Wildlife Management
(BWM) Wildlife Damage Abatement and Claims Program (WDACP) incorporates 3 approaches to addressing wildlife damage. It provides up to 75% cost-share
abatement support for farmers through participating
county agencies, it provides for a depredation permit
(“hot spot” permit) system that allows landowners with
special permits to shoot problem deer, and it provides
compensation up to US$15,000 per farmer per year.
Farmers sustaining damage by deer, geese, bear, and
turkey are eligible, and 80 to 90% of estimated damage
is due to deer. Surcharges on Wisconsin bonus deer
permit fees earmarked for expenditure on damage
claims and abatement generated almost US$3.5 million
in 1996, with almost US$1 million put toward abatement and US$1.7 million toward compensation. For the
1995 fiscal year, 11.4% of the total departmental budget
went to the wildlife damage program. Wisconsin’s BWM
damage estimates in 1996 averaged US$2,813 per claimant (farm), and 1,266 claimants received on average
US$2,324 in compensation.
The BWM issued 394 hot spot permits to landowners in 1995, under which 3,908 deer were killed
(as compared to general bow and gun permit kills
of 467,271). Most crop damage occurs before hunting
season, which generally is held in late October, and hot
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spot permits allow farmers (or hunters at the farmers
request) to shoot deer out of season on land suffering
crop damage. Issuance of the permit is contingent on
reasonable prior abatement by landowners and evidence
of at least US$1,000 of deer damage to crops. The land
must be open to hunting for the following hunting
season, and the landowner must also sign a contract
agreeing not to deny a hunter’s request for access to his
land unless 2 hunters per 40 acres are already on his
land at the time of the access request. That the BWM
issues permits implies that landowners may not kill
these game species at their own discretion or without
prior permission. Thus, damage abatement of this form,
which results in the loss of the value of an individual
game animal as a hunting target, is restricted (Implications 1 and 2).
Although the permits issued to a farmer in a given
year may all be used by the farmer, the farmer may keep
only 1 of the deer taken with his or her allotment. Most
hot spot permits are made available to hunters (Horton
and Craven 1997). Thus, the value of the deer as game is
captured by allowing hunters to perform the abatement
(implication 4). The overall benefits of killing a deer out
of season may be lower than the benefits accrued from
hunting during the regular season due to time, location,
and hunting’s effect on the deer population dynamics.
Thus, the tradeoff is between the costs of allowing hunters to harvest out of season and the gains from both
reduction in damage and reduction in incentives for
landowners to pursue alternative abatement efforts that
may harm the wildlife population while not capturing
any of their benefits.
When BWM representatives (usually county
extension agents) assess claims, they usually recommend the use of abatement techniques. These
abatement recommendations become requirements for
receiving compensation, and form the basis of the abatement costs that are shared by the landowner and the
agency. In addition to hot spot permits, commonly
implemented abatement methods include the installation of various types of fencing, the use of lure crops
and scaring devices, and the application of chemical
deterrents.
Hot spot permits as a means of marrying hunting
benefits with damage reduction have already been discussed. Fencing is a relatively benign form of abatement
and is easily monitored (Implications 10 and 11). The
BWM has 15-year written contracts for installation and
maintenance of permanent fences for deer damage
abatement, and fences are installed around approximately 13% of fields for which the BWM provides compensation. As implied by the model, the agency may
benefit from subsidizing fencing in 2 ways, even if
the fence has no discernible (or even negative) impact
on the wildlife population. First, the installation of
a fence will reduce landowner incentives to perform

other abatement activities that may be more harmful to
the wildlife stock. For example, a fence that keeps deer
out of crop fields will reduce the incentive for farmers
to shoot deer on sight or clear scrub from around the
field that may act as valuable (yet inexpensive) forage
and cover for deer. To put it another way, subsidizing
a fence to reduce damage provides positive incentives
to landowners to leave or even promote wildlife habitat
on their land. Second, when used in conjunction with a
compensation program, the subsidy will counteract the
reduction in the incentive to perform abatement that
the compensation mechanism induces (Implication 12).
Damage eligible for compensation under the Wisconsin WDACP includes damage by deer, bears, geese,
or turkeys. The type of damaged agricultural property
eligible includes commercial seedlings or crops growing on agricultural land, harvested crops remaining on
agricultural land, orchard trees, nursery stock, apiaries,
or livestock (Wisconsin Code §29.889 (6), 1997-1998).
Thus, compensation is provided only to those property
owners who have control over the resources (land)
utilized by the valuable game species wildlife (Implication 6) for damage imposed by valuable game species
(Implication 5).
Not only does the BWM provide out-of-season
hot spot permits, but the farmer is required to allow
hunting on compensation-eligible land during the open
season. In 1 of 2 access rules a farmer can choose
(called the “managed hunting access” plan), the farmer
must allow up to 2 hunters per 40 acres of eligible
land to hunt at any given time during the open season.5
This provision serves a purpose similar to that of hot
spot permits by promoting abatement by hunters and
offsetting the disincentive for abatement generated by
compensation (Implications 4 and 5). The right of landowners to control hunter access to their land becomes
a critical issue for herd management in regions where
private agricultural land is a major source of wildlife
habitat (Witmer and DeCalesta 1992, Vander Zouwen
and Warnke 1994, Gardner 1997, McCabe and McCabe
1997, McShea et al. 1997a). As with abatement in general, compensation reduces a landowner’s incentive to
allow hunting on his or her land because it reduces the
cost of wildlife to the landowner. This contract stipulation allows agencies to utilize a compensation program
to overcome this problem and address access issues
as well. Furthermore, monitoring this requirement is
relatively easy. Landowners are included in a list of
participants that is available to hunters, and are required
to keep a log of hunters on their land. Hunters have the
right and an incentive to report to the agency if they feel
they have been disallowed access.
5

A hunter may be turned down if he or she is intoxicated, causes property
damage, or if the hunter does not secure prior permission from the landowner (Wisconsin code §29.889 (7M) 1997-1998). These exceptions are
consistent with the model as well.
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Table 1: State damage policiesa
ST
AL
AK
AZ
CA
CO
CT
FL
GA
ID
IL
IN
IA
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NM
NY
ND
OH
PA
RI
SC
SD
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

No permit required
species
to defend
CY
pred
pred

any
any
lvstck

BR,ML

lvstck

BR,ML,WF

lvstck

FH
BV
any
various
any

any
lvstck,crp
any
not grass

most
pred
pred

any
lvstck
lvstck

any
any

any
lvstck

pred,furb

any

furb
BC

any
any

DR,BR
FX
any

crops
lvstck
any

Out-of-season depredation permits
issued for
to defend
carcass owner
game
pred, BV
game
DR,EK,BV
any
any
DR,BR
BR
any
pred,furb
any
any
any
BR

crops
any
crops
any
any
any
crops
bhive
any
any
any

D
LL
D
LL

D
D
LL

any
bhive

D

any

D

any

D

furb

any

D

BV,TE,game
various
BR,ML
any
DR
deer
any
any
any
BV

crops,lvstck
any
any
any
crops
any
any
any

D
LL
D
LL
D
D

various

any

DR,TE
various
DR,TK,BR
BV

LL
LL
L

DR,BR
DR,BR,WF
pred

lvstck

LL

SPECIES: AN=antelope, BC=bobcat, BR=bear, BV=beaver, CY=coyote, DR=deer, EK=elk, FH=hatchery fish, FX=fox,
GB=game birds, ML=mountain lion, MS=moose, NN=non-native species, PH=pheasant, TE=threatened or endangered,
TK=turkey, WF=wolf, game=unspecified game, bgame=big game, pred=unspecified predators, various=large specific
list of various game and/or predators. RESOURCE DAMAGED: any=unspecified property or wildlife, lvstck=livestock,
bhive=beehive. OWNERSHIP: D=Department, L=landowner, LL=landowner, limited use. ABATEMENT SUPPORT:
C=consulting, L=abatement labor, K=abatement capital.
a
Data for these tables were taken from state fish and game regulations, Musgrave and Stein (1993) and Wildlife Management
Institute (1997).
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Table 2: State damage policiesa
ST

abatement
support

AK
AZ
CO
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
ME
MD
MA
MN
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NM
ND
OH
PA
SD
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

C,L,K
C,L
C,L
C,L
C,L
C,L
C,K
C,L,K
C,L,K

abatement

Contingent on
nonposting

x
x

x
x

DR,EK,AN
game,ML,BR

x

x

CY
BR,CY

x

Compensation
for (species)
BV
BR,ML,DR,EK,AN
DR,BR,EK,MS,AN,ML

access
fees

x

CY
BR
DR,MS
WF,EK

C,L,K
C,L
C,L
C,L,K
C,L,K
C,L,K
C,L,K
C,L,K
C,L,K
C
C,L,K

C,L,K

bgame

DR,EK,BR,ML,PH,AN,MS,BV
BR,DR
BR,DR
DR,EK
BR
DR,BR,WF
bgame,WF

x
x
x

x

x

SPECIES: AN=antelope, BC=bobcat, BR=bear, BV=beaver, CY=coyote, DR=deer, EK=elk, FH=hatchery fish, FX=fox,
GB=game birds, ML=mountain lion, MS=moose, NN=non-native species, PH=pheasant, TE=threatened or endangered,
TK=turkey, WF=wolf, game=unspecified game, bgame=big game, pred=unspecified predators, various=large specific list of
various game and/or predators. ABATEMENT SUPPORT: C=consulting, L=abatement labor, K=abatement capital.
a

Data for these tables were taken from state fish and game regulations, Musgrave and Stein (1993) and Wildlife Management
Institute (1997).

State law and regulatory policy
Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of some of
the wildlife damage and management policies for the 50
states. Blank spaces indicate that either state statutes or
written agency policy did not apply to column description for that state, or there was no mention of the
column topic in any of the sources. The data in these
tables were spot checked with various agency personnel
during the course of this research.
Table 1 shows the rights of landowners to take
(kill) protected species, where protected species are
those species for which the wildlife manager (wildlife

agencies) impose a closed season for part the
year. The second and third columns of Table
1 entitled, “no permit required for protected
species lists protected species” that landowners
may destroy without prior agency permission (Musgrave and Stein (1993) and state statutes).
In general, species that have the potential to inflict
significant damage in a short amount of time are widely
represented; livestock predators, for example. In this
case, the marginal value of a rapid response to depredation is high and restrictions on rapid response are costly
(Implication 2).
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Note that valuable big game species such as deer
and elk are absent from the second and third columns
of Table 1 (with the exception of Vermont). The high
marginal value for hunting of a big game species results
in large potential loss of value when a big game animal
is taken for depredation purposes by non-hunters
(Implication 8).6 Instead, the regulatory response has
been to allow abatement, but only in a more restricted
form that both provides discretion on the part of the
agency and in some cases facilitates the transference
of “abatement rights” to hunters (columns 3-5 of Table
1, out-of-season depredation permits. Sources: Musgrave and Stein (1993) and state statutes). This way (as
discussed in the context of Wisconsin), the value of the
game species as a target for hunters is not entirely lost
in the process of abatement.
Some wildlife departments also organize special
out-of-season depredation hunts in order to address specific damage problems by game animals such as deer.
This too acts to address property damage problems
while capturing some of the benefit of the game animal
through sport hunting (Implication 11).
Note also that when landowners retain ownership
of the carcass, there are usually legal limits on its use
(Table 1, column 6). For example, a deer shot with a
depredation permit by law might only be used by the
landowners immediate family. This can be viewed as
a means to limit the potential value of a game carcass
in order to reduce incentive for fraudulent requests for
depredation permits.
Table 2 focuses on agency abatement and compensation programs. Most state wildlife agencies are
explicitly authorized by state statute to provide abatement support in the form of consulting, abatement
labor, and/or abatement capital. State wildlife agencies
are the regulatory authority over wildlife, but most
wildlife agencies cooperate with the United States
Department of Agriculture, Wildlife Services Program
(WS). In many cases, WS performs much of the damage
control work. In some cases, particularly with big game
species, WS activity is monitored by state wildlife agencies (Fagerstone and Clay 1997). In other cases, such
as with coyote control in many western states, wildlife
agencies participate little or not at all. In this context,
WS acts as a representative of agricultural interests, and
may be a mechanism to internalize the joint interests of
landowners in dealing with damage. At current population levels in the west, the relatively low marginal
value of an individual coyote in terms of trapping value,
hunting value, and coyote population health provides
6

relatively little incentive to limit lethal abatement techniques (Implication 1).7
Up to 80% of agencies that provide compensation
for damage also provided abatement assistance, and
70% of them tie compensation payments to some form
of abatement requirements (Wagner et al. 1997).8 In
some states, compensation is also contingent on allowing hunter access to their land, which reduces the
local population while providing hunting benefits to
the public. When access fees are charged by landowners, compensation payments are often reduced by the
revenues received from charging for access (Wisconsin
is one state that does this).
Compensation programs tend to be reserved for
relatively valuable species (last 2 columns of Table 2,
and Wagner et al. (1997)). As in Wisconsin, certain
requirements are usually placed on landowners, such
as having to follow abatement recommendations of the
wildlife agency and, for game animals, allowing hunters
on the land on which damage is occurring. Hypotheses
regarding abatement and compensation programs discussed in the previous section in the context of Wisconsin are broadly supported across states.
As Table 1 shows, Kentucky, Ohio, and Pennsylvania have compensation programs for livestock depredation by coyote through their departments of agriculture,
but in all cases the programs are based on domestic
dog laws and are paid for out of general county or
state funds rather than by producers. Compensation
programs have been discussed at length among sheep
producers, but apparently no such program has ever
been implemented that is entirely funded by sheep producers (Wagner 1972, p. 46-48).
If the costs of measuring damage are high, the
value of a compensation program as a contracting tool
will be low. The model therefore suggests that compensation programs will be more likely when damage
measurement costs are low. Many programs specify
the types of damage that are eligible for compensation
(Wagner et al. 1997). For example, most or all programs
for damage by ungulates pay for damage to seasonal
crops, for which damage to a given crop is relatively
easy to calculate. Compensation for damage done by
predators is often limited to livestock losses, and bear
damage compensation payments are in some cases
limited to beehive damage. No programs compensate
for bodily injury, and none compensate for forest products or damage to standing timber or seedlings. Actual
damage to both of these types of property is likely to
7

The growth of the animal rights movement represents an increase in the
perceived costs of various lethal abatement methods. The model provides
implications about the impact of such a change in perceptions, but they will
not be addressed here.

8

The data in Table 2 indicate lower percentages than those presented in
Wagner et al. (1997). The data in this Table are based primarily on state
statute requirements, whereas the Wagner et al. (1997) are based on survey
results.

When laws specify which type of agricultural resource can be legally
defended by non-permit taking, it tends to be livestock and field crops.
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be difficult to accurately measure and is therefore less
likely to be applicable for a compensation program
(Implications 8 and 12).
CONCLUSION
This paper examines the structure of compensation and abatement programs for addressing wildlife
damage to agricultural property. In doing so, it provides
insight into the incentives of both parties for developing
such contracts, and how participants’ incentives are
altered in the context of such contracts. It also examines the costs associated with maintaining such contracts, including measurement costs associated with
damage assessment for compensation purposes, and the
costs of monitoring contracted abatement labor.
The hypothesis that persistent institutions act as
if to maximize wealth of public or common property
resources subject to informational constraints and contracting costs has been argued widely (Alchian 1950, Stigler 1992), and in the context of wildlife law and regulatory structure more specifically (Lueck 1991, Lueck and
Yoder 1997). This analysis provides a model and broad
evidence to suggest that wildlife damage institutions are
generally consistent with a theory of constrained wealth
maximization over wildlife resources.
To the extent that maximization of the net value
of wildlife resources for all interested parties is an
explicit objective of wildlife managers, it provides a
conceptual framework for designing wildlife damage
and compensation programs to satisfy this objective.
The model suggests that damage abatement and hunting
policy should be designed in an attempt to consider the
resource costs of wildlife populations and the benefits
of wildlife populations, as well as the relative costs and
effectiveness of implementing alternative policy structures.
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